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A FETISHISED GIFT 
The Legal Status of Flags 
Graeme Orr* 
Accounts of the relationship between flags and the law have 
focused on a narrow strain of contentions drawn from debates 
about political expression. This essay seeks to bridge the gap 
between cultural studiesʼ insight into nationalism and its 
symbolics, and the flagʼs legal status, to better understand the 
unique position occupied by national flags. Flag ʻwavingʼ has 
become more prevalent in many liberal democracies. In such 
societies, flags occupy not a religious role, but a quiet and 
quotidian place in what Billig terms ʻbanal nationalismʼ. As a 
cipher for the whole, a particular flagʼs design is relatively 
unimportant; what lends it power is a mix of the gravity 
bestowed by its official designation and the easy 
commodification lent by a flagʼs easy reproducibility and 
portability. Unlike other state symbols such as the currency, 
coat of arms and honorifics, the state does not seek to 
monopolise the flagʼs use, let alone define its meaning. An 
analysis of the laws in several countries governing flag 
designation, observance and ʻdesecrationʼ reveals that the law 
accords the flag distinct status yet only equivocal protection. 
While the state may crave its citizensʼ fealty, a flag is not a 
symbol of some distant governmentality. Rather, it is gifted to 
ʻthe peopleʼ and relies for its relevance on its organic 
proliferation. As both object and image, people attribute a 
power to the flag – a power they recognise over themselves 
and others with whom they share a body politic. A key source 
of this fetishisation is its official, legal designation. Though it 
embodies no particular values, a flag is valued, even fetishised, 
by flag-wavers and flag-burners alike. 
Introduction 
This article begins with a reflection on the meaning and rhetoric of 
contemporary flag use, to put into context the rise in the use of flags in 
recent years. It goes on to explore the detail and meaning of the law giving 
status to national flags, with a focus on Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States. In doing so, it seeks to tease out what, if anything, acts of 
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flag-waving and flag-destruction share, the extent to which both reveal a 
fetishism of flags and the law’s relationship to that fetish.  
The legal act of designating an official flag – unlike the law governing 
other national symbols and currencies – is intended to encourage its 
proliferation, rather than create a monopoly. A flag is not an official symbol 
in the sense of representing a formal, even distant, governmentality. A flag is 
inevitably a cipher, and hence a site for contested values. As a result, 
although the state desires to encourage honour and respect for the flag, and 
hence the state’s symbolic self, the law is equivocal about punishing flag-
destruction, let alone constraining flag use.  
Ultimately, if the flag is to maintain its place as something gifted to a 
people, it relies for its relevance on its reproducibility and organic 
proliferation. It needs to be valued, indeed fetishised, by flag-wavers and 
flag-burners alike. Like most fetishes, flag fetishism bestows an arational 
power upon a common object. An otherwise empty, geodesic design on a 
piece of fabric is invested not just with the ability to symbolise, even bind, 
otherwise disparate people within a fractious liberal legal order: it comes to 
possess such emotional power that its mere sight inspires some to tears and 
others to jeers. 
Thus, while this article considers the statutory and case law concerning 
flags, our concern is not with the flag’s constitutional status in any formal 
sense, but its constitutive role and how the law intersects with this. Nor is 
our purpose to explore the meaning of the layout of any particular flag. As 
Kolstø observes, from the perspective of divided societies, there are ‘no 
inherent qualities in state symbols that prevent them from being accepted 
[and] likewise, no particular design will ... guarantee their success’.1 
Australian republicans and supporters of Ausflag,2 who for reasons of 
aesthetics and modernisation want to jettison the union jack and create a 
more vibrant colour scheme for their national flag, share the same project 
and assumptions about the flag’s importance as the conservative Australian 
National Flag Association (ANFA).3 Even if the flag were the boxing 
kangaroo, rather than the present mix of union jack, federation star and 
southern cross constellation, it would still appear on flagpoles and stickers, 
and be burnt at protests.4 
                                                           
1  Kolstø (2006), p 676. 
2  ‘Ausflag is an apolitical, non-profit organisation seeking to secure the popular support of 
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4  On the Union Jack as an empty signifier, capable of recontextualisation, see Reichl 
(2004). 
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Suburban Nationalism: Fad, Fealty and Fetish 
At our local kindergarten recently, I noticed a new phenomenon. A fellow 
‘kindy dad’ was lowering an Australian flag. Neatly folded, the flag was put 
away quietly, ready for the same gentleman to unfurl and hoist it the next 
morning. At this community kindergarten, each parent is rostered several 
times a year to act as a teacher-aide. Within weeks, it had become an 
expected – but not mandatory – part of roster duties to raise and lower the 
flag each day. The ritual was not part of the curriculum. Rather, it was fitted 
into the quiet, quotidian tasks, like laying out morning tea and cleaning 
tables. Some of the four-year-olds found the sight of the unfurling flag 
captivating; the majority, however, seemed blithe to the purpose of the 
exercise.5 
Driving on, that same day, to the local primary school, I noticed a 
different phenomenon. In a four-wheel-drive vehicle sat a parent, also 
waiting for her offspring. Her car featured a brusque bumper sticker. On it 
was emblazoned the Australian flag, and in bold capitals the legend: 
‘Support it. Or F*#k off’. It was an aggressive variant of a more common 
sticker also featuring the flag: ‘Love it or leave it’.6 Between the quiet, yet 
very public, display of the flag at the kindergarten and the threatening 
proclamation of the bumper sticker, there lie two different performances of 
suburban nationalism. 
Suburban nationalism is not new, but the manner and frequency of its 
expression seem to be intensifying. The evidence is all around: from the 
burgeoning business of installing flagpoles in front yards, through the 
employment of the flag in political and commercial sloganeering, to the 
often unquestioned instances of politicians wrapping themselves 
metaphorically – and occasionally literally7 – in the flag. The most obvious 
manifestation is the rapid rise in public displays of flags around Australia 
Day. At a quiet apartment in a downbeat seaside resort on a recent 
January 26, I counted no fewer than sixteen Australian flags around a small 
lap pool. Flag display on motor vehicles has also become commonplace. 
Months on from Australia Day, plastic flags regularly can be seen fluttering 
from passing cars. (The concatenation of motor vehicle and flag is itself 
intriguing. The car represents physical liberty to many; the flag, too, is often 
said to stand for liberty. Yet, while the plethora of different makes of cars is 
taken to express individuality, the flag’s uniformity is meant to elide 
differences and unite the group.)8 
                                                           
5  ‘Blithe’ in the sense of ‘lightheartedly heedless’. 
6  An even brasher, if flagless, xenophobic slogan has since appeared: ‘Fcuk Off, We’re 
Full’, emblazoned on a map of Australia. 
7  An image of Pauline Hanson, draped in the Australian flag, became a trademark poster for 
her One Nation Party and an autographed souvenir for her fans. The identification of the 
female form with ethnic virtue is a commonplace fantasy, softening the otherwise 
aggressive implications of exclusive group identities: Warner (1985), Chs 6–8.  
8  That car windows and bumpers are a common site for political speech is curious too: the 
highway was once the place for public gatherings and protests. Yet in modernity, cars do 
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The fetishisation of the flag as a cult object, which peaks on Australia 
Day and is renewed every Anzac Day, is so great that people have forgotten 
the quaint proclamation, by Governor-General Deane in 1996, of 
3 September as ‘National Flag Day’.9 Some think it ironic that these flags are 
invariably manufactured in China. But there is no irony. A liberal trade 
regime and consumer capitalism, in which most consumer goods are sourced 
abroad, are as much defining features of modern Australia as tariff 
protection was a key feature of post-federation Australia  
A similar, if stronger, conjoining of flag-waving and consumerism was 
apparent in the United States in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 
2001. As President Bush urged Americans to shop, freedom was equated 
with continuing consumption, inverting the historical equation of conflict 
and adversity with frugality and denial. Wal-Mart, the world’s largest (and 
already ostentatiously patriotic) retailer was one obvious locus for this call to 
mercantile arms. Ready-to-fly flags were the first item on many shopping 
lists: on September 11 itself, Wal-Mart’s flag sales leapt almost twenty-fold, 
quickly exhausting its stock of nearly 500,000 flags.10 Such commodification 
of the flag was repeated across social classes, with a resurgence of interest in 
American folk art.11 (Once, shared struggles were measured in blood, iron 
and sacrifice, through military service, manufacturing productivity and 
deprivation on rations. In the post-industrial society, what matters is 
maintaining the velocity of the money supply, in which the generation of 
credit can be cast as noble rather than selfish.) 
Yet the flag is no ordinary object of status-seeking consumption. ABC 
TV’s Compass program recently described flag flying as ‘spiritual 
symbolism’.12 Nationalism undoubtedly may appear to approximate a form 
of secular religion. Morisey, describing US flag observance, recites a 
familiar argument that American patriotism ‘operates as a religion’ and has 
an essentially ‘religious nature’.13 Flag-waving sometimes occurs with 
almost evangelical fervour. In their longer study of the ‘totemic’ flag rituals 
of American nationhood, Marvin and Ingle depict the use of the stars and 
stripes as ‘magical and primitive’, even essential to ward off the dissolution 
of nation.14 These commentators employ ‘religion’ in either a metaphorical 
or a functionalist sense. Such a metaphorical usage is heard whenever 
proponents of criminalising flag-destruction frame the practice as flag 
‘desecration’. An example of a functional usage is Berlant’s argument that a 
flag inscribes a ‘National Symbolic’, whose inclusiveness does not just 
                                                                                                                              
not rally together; on the contrary, they compete and create, out of the public highway, a 
partly privatised space. 
9  Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No S321, 28 August 1996. 
10  Scanlon (2005), p 177. 
11  Scanlon (2005), p 181. 
12  ABC Television (2009). 
13  Morisey (2007), especially pp 5–12. 
14  Marvin and Ingle (1999), p 1. 
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merely cure citizenship of a formal emptiness, but whose lack may even 
generate an existential vulnerability through a sense of not-belonging.15 
However, nationalism does not require a ‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’ 
attachment – unless we stretch those terms to embrace any form of tribalism 
or idolatory through which individuals identify with a group larger than their 
family and invest meaning in some shared social symbols. That nationalism 
is not inherently religious is revealed by the fact that these two forms of 
social and belief systems coexist. Whereas religions are typically exclusive 
of other religions and nationalisms are jealous of rivals, most religions live 
harmoniously alongside nationalism.16 Certainly, in the protocols around flag 
usage we can see parallels with the rituals of religion. In a very broad sense 
of ‘religious’, people sometimes attribute an essentialising role to the flag. 
Yet not only are national flags not reliant on any religion,17 for a flag to 
flourish it must proliferate in many profane environments, from the canopies 
of 4WDs to the bacchanalia of one-day cricket contests.  
Nationalisms – indeed, nations themselves – are politico-legal fictions 
that have to be created and re-created. In Benedict Anderson’s definition, a 
nation is ‘an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign’.18 Anderson’s great insight was into the 
importance of the printed word in allowing the modern nation state, an 
eighteenth century construct, to invent the myths of its past necessary to 
maintain itself into the future. However, in their very nature, pre-literate 
symbols like flags (and heraldry more widely) have been used for much 
longer than words, and to enculturate loyalty to a much broader range of 
social orderings than nation-states.  
As diagnosed in Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism, a feature of 
contemporary – especially Western – nationalism is its taken-for-
grantedness. Like all prevailing ideologies, the phenomenon draws, rather 
than dissipates, power from the unnoticed and almost forgotten ways in 
which it suffuses cultural and political life.19 In Billig’s argument, the flag 
becomes a verb, a cute metaphor for a host of symbols, categories and 
language tropes that are employed routinely, usually without reflection, to 
discursively ‘flag’ and hence constitute the national order of ‘us’, ‘the 
people’.20  
In times of war, contemporary nation-states still marshal the older 
martial rhetoric about rallying around and dying for the flag. This occurs 
                                                           
15  Berlant (1991), p 24. 
16  This applies whether the faith is global in its ambitions (eg Catholicism or Islam), global 
in its dimensions (eg Buddhism) or, conversely, has strong links to a national tradition 
(eg Anglicanism or Serbian Orthodoxy). 
17  This is not to say that a nation may choose to proclaim some official religious identity via 
its flag, though in the West who reads the crosses on the Union Jack or the Danish, Swiss 
or Swedish flags as anything other than geometric patterns of historical curiosity? 
18  Anderson (1983), p 6. 
19  Billig (1995). For a visual essay on Billig’s relevance to Australia, see Allmark (2007). 
20  Billig (1995), Ch 5. 
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even outside times of conflict, and especially around contemporary Anzac 
Days.21 These displays seek to infuse the flag with particular meanings, as if 
the flag were the inarticulate premise on which such sacrifices are assumed 
to have been made. Thus Australian legal academic Dan Meagher, while 
arguing for a robust freedom of communication, also valorises the flag’s 
potentially atavistic qualities: 
it has come to embody the people and events that forged and, in times 
of crisis, defended the democratic institutions and liberties that are 
the bedrock of the free, open and tolerant society that Australians 
enjoy and for which they are justifiably proud.22 
In this process, without even the need to justify claims about which of 
many contested values the flag might embody, the flag reveals its special 
potential – but not as something sacred, for the flag cannot be holy; rather, 
the flag’s potential accrues from the official nature of its birth: a flag is not 
so much created by its original designer as by the law’s designation of it as a 
visual emblem for a whole. Its special status is thus born of the 
acknowledgement, if not reverence, it receives in its formal settings, most 
especially when hoisted on a pole in an official setting.23  
It is in this sense that we can talk of flag fetishism. As both object and 
image, people attribute a power to the flag, a power they recognise over 
themselves and others with whom they share a body politic. It can be seen in 
the devotion of those most loyal to the flag, but also in the fixations of the 
flag-burner. It is a recognition of the power of the nation, but not its classic 
or ‘hard’ power (the state’s monopolies over treasury, army and courts) so 
much as its mythical power to bind disparate peoples and regions together, 
transcending more organic group forms such as the family, clan or tribe. 
The flag is an attempt by the body politic to distill its ethereal form in a 
flourish that is at once formal (the legal designation of an official flag) and 
informal (the flag is not a text, such as a constitutional preamble, attempting 
to distill a particular vision in contestable terms). Many entities, of course, 
seek to distill themselves in a simple visual form, whether through a 
traditional coat of arms or modern corporate branding. Bodies corporate may 
seek to manufacture some substantive – as opposed to legal – personality 
through their logos and get-ups. Yet, unlike such logos, the flag is neither 
intended to be, nor capable of being, captured and controlled. Its use is not 
monopolised, let alone its meanings determined by governmental advertising 
or rhetoric. The flag’s unique, official status is not designed to erect a 
monopoly, but to encourage its almost viral use, through the fetish that is the 
shared acceptance of the power of the flag.  
                                                           
21  For a critique, see Lake et al (2010). 
22  Meagher (2009), pp 101–2. 
23  There is a quasi-religious element to flag use when the state buries its dead – for example, 
in the lowering of flags and their draping over the coffins of service personnel or police 
officers.  
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The Flag in Australia 
American culture, as Marvin and Ingle tell us, is ‘holographically saturated’ 
with its flag.24 Traditionally, Australians believed themselves to exhibit a 
greater wariness of flag-waving than societies such as the United States. 
Whether true or not, this belief befitted the persistent assumption (if not 
national myth) that Australians are laconic and undemonstrative. It is also 
consistent with the argument that Australia was traditionally guided by 
social utilitarianism.25 That is, without being overly statist, Australia was 
driven by pragmatism rather than by appeals to natural rights or over-arching 
ideologies, and was comfortable with a quiet egalitarianism in which 
government and law sought to maximise communal welfare. In this 
understanding of Australia, flags were for limited occasions such as 
governmental buildings and commemorations. That wariness of widespread 
flag-waving and display is clearly wearing away. It may be no coincidence 
that this rise in flag-waving coincided with the Howard government’s efforts 
to foster a national identity and narrative. Examples of such efforts include 
the ubiquitous branding of activities and programs with the coat of arms,26 
the institution of a citizenship test and the moves to a national history 
curriculum. 
This view of Australia as formerly agnostic about flag observance was 
always a partial fiction. For a segment of the population, flags have been 
critical markers of fealty and expressions of identity. Thus flags have long 
been used to display pride in competitive settings, such as during wartime or 
sporting contests. The Australian flag, however, had a rival in the Union 
Jack, which persisted well into the second half of the twentieth century – 
despite the passing of the Flags Act 1953 – 27 as a symbol of a people-within-
an-Empire, and of allegiance to the Crown. The Union Jack was 
commonplace in halls and during public meetings. Generations of Australian 
schoolchildren were required to observe the Union Jack and, well into the 
1970s, to sing God Save the Queen. Perhaps because of that uneasy division, 
uniquely Australian symbols took time to be fully embraced. But in recent 
years the words of Advance Australia Fair (or at least its first verse and 
chorus) have become second nature to the children brought up on them. 
Similarly, everyday acts of flag display – whether through flag-flying on 
cars, at private kindergartens and even flag-burning – have taken root today.  
Undeniably, there is a racial element to some of this. The flag was 
utterly central to the Hansonite One Nation movement. Whether tattooed on 
the skin, painted on the face and worn to the Cronulla race riots, or 
                                                           
24  Marvin and Ingle (1999), p 5. 
25  Collins (1985).  
26  Such branding covers not just governmental activities but some private activity, in the 
case of creative work given Australia Council for the Arts funding: Orr (2007), pp 24–26 
(including n 25). 
27  Flags Act 1953 (Cth): ‘An Act to declare a certain Flag to be the Australian National Flag 
and to make other provision with respect to Flags’. 
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brandished at a Big Day Out rock concert,28 many now appropriate the 
Australian flag as an expression of a narrow brand of ‘Aussie’ nationalism. 
In its more militant uses, the flag is wielded confrontationally – as a 
symbolic weapon – against whichever recently arrived ethnic group is 
accused of failing to assimilate. 
Yet such stridency is far from the received version of nationalism. 
There are various overlapping, sometimes conflicting, versions of what it 
means to be ‘Australian’. Adapting George Orwell,29 former Prime Minister 
Keating sought to distinguish ‘nationalism’ (bad) from ‘patriotism’ (good).30 
At first the distinction seems inapt. ‘Patriotism’, in Samuel Johnson’s 
epigram, is ‘the last refuge of a scoundrel’. However, Johnson was not 
impugning all love of country. Rather, he was chastising both those who 
think ‘my country, right or wrong’, and those who would prey on such 
sentiments – such as politicians who manipulate citizens to elevate patriotic 
urges and commitments into an ideology. 
Keating’s partisan claim was that nationalistic sentiment under then 
Prime Minister Howard played a putative mainstream against 
multiculturalism and non-European immigration.31 Keating’s – or rather 
Orwell’s – less partisan point was to seek to separate a potentially 
exclusionary, negative and manipulable force (labelled ‘nationalism’) from a 
more positive sentiment, a love of country in the sense of land and place that 
may have an inclusive embrace (labelled ‘patriotism’). In practice, of course, 
the distinction is mutable: patriotisms can obviously clash, especially when 
two different groups have attachments to the same land. 
The Law of Flag Protection and Destruction 
Of all the various symbols, formal and informal, that peoples and nations 
create and adopt, flags attract a peculiar legal as well as popular interest. In 
modern, logomachic societies, flags are not constitutional devices in the 
legal sense, but they are constitutive in the broader sense. Recognising that 
its own abstraction is a source of frailty, the formal legal order needs to give 
special status to key elements of the figurative order on which it relies for 
fealty. In the shift from identifying legal rule with an identifiable human 
figure like a monarch, bureaucratic democracies crave identifying features in 
the form of symbols rather than in the form of their functional institutions. 
(Indeed, the functional and the symbolic often do not overlap. Symbolic 
engagement may generate what psychologists call ‘ingroup identification’ 
without engendering any understanding of, let alone engagement with, 
                                                           
28  The Age Online (2007). 
29  Orwell (1968), Vol III, p 362. For critique, see Viroli (1997). 
30  ABC Radio, AM (2007). 
31  Keating was a little hypocritical. Some saw his appeals to the Republic, Indigenous 
reconciliation and Australia as an Asian nation as an attempt to erect a new kind of 
nationalism on the dreams of the old. Keating certainly engaged in nationalistic myth-
making, notably in his Kokoda speech.  
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political and governmental processes.)32 This constitutive or identifying ideal 
was captured recently by Governor-General Quentin Bryce’s hope that the 
flag ‘wherever it is raised … stirs in us a sense of unity’ and a sense of being 
‘a small part of a great story’.33 
An array of visual symbols can be employed to metaphorically 
represent the whole, from coats of arms to floral emblems. Yet, of these, 
official flags have proven the most reliable and versatile. Why this is so is 
not entirely clear: perhaps flags present an ideal mix of the concrete/sensual34 
(their colours, their adaptability to different fashion usages, their scenic 
dimension when flown) and the formal (their fixed layout, the protocols 
around them). The easy iterability of flags also contributes to their 
popularity. While music is portable and reproducible, and might be expected 
to evoke positive emotions more directly than a flag, to modern ears most 
national anthems sound dated, even dirgeful.  
Whatever the reason for the pre-eminence of the flag in the non-verbal 
propaganda of the state, it is no coincidence that the law accords the flag 
distinct status but equivocal protection, mainly in the form of weak 
exhortations relating to its dignity and official use.35 Normally when the law 
intervenes to regulate the use of symbols, it is to erect a monopoly – for 
instance, in the granting of honours and ‘state’ funerals, or over a royal style 
or trademarks generally. Regulation of flags is to the contrary: their official 
designation is a precursor to presenting the flag as if it were an endlessly 
reproducible gift to a people. In the following sections, I elaborate on flag 
law, both internationally and in Australia, to reveal two underlying legal 
purposes. The first is to designate the flag as something unique. The second 
is to avoid over-regulating or constraining its use, lest the flag become 
something untouchable, the badge of a distant and formal governmentality 
rather than an object of a widespread fetish. 
Overseas 
The United States is the most obvious starting point for an exploration of 
debates over flag law and practice. This is not merely because flag-burning 
has been particularly prominent and controversial – and flag fetishism has 
reached significant heights – there. Nor is it because the United States is an 
inherently flag-revering nation. As has often been noted, the stars and stripes 
only came to play a significant role in American public life during the civil 
war of the 1860s and1870s – and then, of course, initially only in the north.36  
                                                           
32  Schatz and Lavine (2007), especially pp 351–52. 
33  Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (2009). 
34  Fetishes after all typically centre on objects with a sensual dimension. 
35  In contrast, the Australian coat of arms has no legislative status. It exists, quaintly, through 
an ongoing Royal Warrant granting the second Commonwealth Coat of Arms, 
19 September 1912: www.itsanhonour.gov.au/coat-arms/royal_warrant.cfm. 
36  For example, Sullenger (2005), pp 599–600. 
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Instead, the United States is an obvious starting point because it exhibits 
clearly some of the tensions inherent in liberal nationalism. To different 
degrees, every state exploits symbols such as the flag to mould coherence 
from a disparate community and give meaning to the otherwise formal status 
of citizenship. Methodologically conservative elements of the body politic 
then go to particular lengths to promote identification with national symbols. 
Examples in the United States include enforced pledges of allegiance and 
flag observance in schools. This, of course, can be done to excess. Flag Day 
in the United States morphed into Flag Week,37 and the purpose of setting 
aside a unique day for flag observance has been diluted. Aside from Flag 
Day, no fewer than fourteen other non-holidays are marked by presidentially 
proclaimed exhortations to fly the flag.38 Even those commemorations are 
lost in a swag of patriotic holidays, and rendered somewhat redundant by the 
fact that, year round, the law requires all public institutions, including 
schools, to display the flag during daylight hours.39 As one observer 
commented: ‘In the United States, every day is Flag Day.’40 US federal law 
even declares, in a metonymic flourish, that ‘the flag represents a living 
country and is itself considered a living thing’.41 This animation of the flag 
manifests itself in many ways. The most obvious current example is the 
recent convention that US politicians wear a flag pin42 on their left lapel so 
as to be near their heart.43 Another is the rule that an old flag, like a dying 
person, deserves a dignified farewell and (private) cremation.44 
Yet countervailing liberal elements in the legal order seek to avoid 
turning nationalism into a compulsory principle, and act to restrain the 
majoritarian impulse to impose beliefs on minorities and dissentients. The 
US Code, for instance, does not erect a net of prohibitions around the use of 
the flag. It erects only a minor offence against printing advertising slogans 
on a flag or representation of a flag, or printing a flag on commercial 
merchandise.45 The flag or variants of its colours are in any event routinely 
used in commercial, political and other marketing. Under the national law 
                                                           
37  36 USC §§ 110, 122. 
38  Constitution and Citizenship Day, Columbus Day, Father’s Day, Mother’s Day, Gold Star 
Mother’s Day, Loyalty Day, Aviation Day, Aviation Day, Maritime Day, Korean War 
Veterans Armistice Day, Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day, Peace Officers Memorial Day, 
Police Week, Thomas Jefferson’s Birthday and Patriot (or 9/11) Day: 36 US Code IA, Ch 
1  
39  4 USC § 6. 
40  Rodriguez (2010).  
41  4 US Code § 8(j). 
42  A convention that has become an irresistible expectation; even, or perhaps especially, 
Barack Obama relented and bowed to the pressure to conform when he was running for 
President. 
43  4 USC § 8(j), and see also § 9 on civilians covering their hearts with their right hands 
during flag ceremonies.  
44  4 USC § 8(k).  
45  4 USC § 3. This covers Washington DC only. 
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that gives the US flag its status, then, there is no attempt to monopolise the 
flag as if it were a nationally controlled trademark. Instead, the flag is set 
free with, at most, exhortations that its physical form be shown no 
‘disrespect’.46 
In the United States, this permissive legal order is most prominent in 
the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.47 The US flag debate 
famously came into clearest legal relief in Texas v Johnson.48 There, Gregory 
Johnson burnt the US flag during a protest outside the 1984 Republican 
National Convention. His fine of US$2000 for breaching Texan law (a hefty 
sum at the time, especially for a radical activist) was upheld by a state 
appellate court. But by a bare five to four majority, the US Supreme Court 
struck down the anti-flag-abuse law.  
The court held, unsurprisingly, that the act of burning a flag at a 
political protest was expressive and communicative. Texan authorities put 
forward two governmental interests in criminalising flag-destruction: 
keeping the peace, and protecting a unifying national symbol. The majority, 
however, identified these interests as inseparable from expression. Once it 
was seen as a criminal law targeting a purely expressive act, the law failed 
strict scrutiny under US free speech doctrine.49 However, Justice Stevens – 
otherwise the leading liberal on the court – wrote a passionate dissent, rooted 
in his wartime service and belief that the flag ‘uniquely symbolised’ 
struggles for ‘liberty and equality’.50 
Reflecting the fetishism underlying the dispute, the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Texas v Johnson (and its affirmation in US v Eichman)51 
initially inflamed, rather than settled, contention about criminalising flag-
destruction. On numerous occasions since, the US House of Representatives 
has voted to overturn the decision by endorsing a constitutional amendment 
to protect the US flag – something all 50 state legislatures have endorsed. 
Clearly the flag’s status is not something amenable to polite policy 
disagreements or reasoned precedent. Rather, the very idea of a flag serves 
as an invitation to broader debates about identity and values. 
                                                           
46  4 USC § 8 (which is said to include ‘advertising’ and being printed on ‘anything designed 
for temporary use and discard’: § 8(i)). ‘[T]he Flag Code does not prescribe any penalties 
for non-compliance nor does it include enforcement provisions; rather the Code functions 
simply as a guide to be voluntarily followed by civilians and civilian groups’: Luckey 
(2008). Some states retain laws seeking to restrict the use of the flag (eg in advertising), 
but these are unenforced and – following first amendment case law, unenforceable. 
47  ‘Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech’. 
48  Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989). Similarly, see US v Eichmann 496 US 310 (1990). 
49  In contrast, the burning of a draft card was criminalisable, since such a law helped 
preserve the integrity of the selection system (of which the card was a key element), and 
was not necessarily directed at anti-conscription protestors: US v O’Brien 391 US 367 
(1968). 
50  Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989) at 437. 
51  US v Eichman 496 US 310 (1990). 
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Closer to home – geographically and culturally52 – flag-burning has 
become an issue in New Zealand in recent years. The New Zealand national 
flag is legislatively declared to be ‘the symbol of the Realm, Government, 
and people of New Zealand’.53 The most prominent case has been Hopkinson 
v Police.54 Demonstrating outside Parliament in Wellington against the visit 
of the Australian Prime Minister during the invasion of Iraq, Paul Hopkinson 
burnt an upside-down New Zealand flag. A fellow protestor burnt the 
Australian flag as well. Hopkinson was fined NZ$600 for the offence of 
public destruction of the flag with intent to dishonour it.55  
On appeal to the High Court, Ellen France J overturned the conviction. 
She held that freedom of expression and assembly required the term 
‘dishonour’ to be read narrowly.56 Although ‘dishonour’ would ordinarily 
embrace the indignity of being immolated in kerosene, the narrower 
meaning of ‘defile’ or ‘vilify’ was also open. This reads a heavily subjective 
element into what is otherwise a purely material offence of destroying an 
object in public. It may even leave the offence of flag-destruction only 
available in rare or gratuitous defacements, like wiping it on one’s buttocks 
or, as one lawyer has suggested, where the flag is targeted for its own sake – 
say, by republicans.57  
New Zealand authorities subsequently resorted to the lesser offence of 
offensive behaviour to charge one of Hopkinson’s fellow peace activists, 
Valerie Morse, with flag-burning at an Anzac Day dawn service in protest at 
New Zealand’s military deployment in Afghanistan. The flag was ignited at 
the same moment another protester blew a trumpet to disrupt the 
commemoration. Given this context, the Court of Appeal upheld her 
conviction: the protest was designed to offend the sensitivity of the dawn 
service.58 But the court avoided creating a rule against flag-burning. Only the 
intrusion of the protest into another expressive gathering justified the 
finding. (Morse is appealing and the Supreme Court is to give the matter 
final consideration.) What is important about both the Hopkinson and Morse 
cases is the reluctance of the law to unduly restrict the flag’s use, consistent 
with the idea that the flag is neither owned by the state nor some sub-set of 
its people, but is a gift to all. 
                                                           
52  The New Zealand and Australian flags are so similar as to be indistinguishable to most 
outsiders. 
53  Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act 1981 (NZ), s 5(2). 
54  Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704. 
55  Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act 1981 (NZ), s 11(1)(b). 
56  Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704, applying New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZ), ss 14, 16. 
57 Price (2010).  
58  R v Morse [2009] NZCA 623. 
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Flag Status in Australia 
The legal status of the Australian flag has been anchored for over half a 
century in the Flags Act 1953 (Cth). That statute sets out the design of the 
flag and declares the blue version to be ‘the Australian National Flag’.59 The 
Governor-General is then empowered to make ‘rules’ – in truth, ceremonial 
protocols – about the method of flying the flag. But these merely consist of 
exhortations not to show indignity to the national flag, such as by flying it 
below another flag or letting it touch the ground. The two flags established 
directly by the Act are the standard national flag on a blue backdrop, as well 
as a red version as a merchant shipping ensign (reflecting the historical 
importance of shipping and the need for a colour contrasting with the sea 
and sky). Neither flag was present at Federation itself. Instead, they emerged 
after a local competition and were vetted by the British government before 
gazettal by the Australian government.60  
There is also an official Australian Aboriginal flag and a Torres Strait 
Islander flag. Although their copyright does not lie with the Crown,61 their 
status as sub-national flags was proclaimed under the Flags Act in 1995 and 
2008 respectively. Olympian Cathy Freeman was simultaneously lauded and 
excoriated for parading with both the Australian national and Australian 
Aboriginal flags at the height of her success.62 Her gesture only worked 
because she presented the Aboriginal flag as a supplement, and not a 
challenge, to the national flag. The Indigenous flags have since been 
incorporated routinely into governmental ceremonies under both 
conservative and Labor administrations.63 By contrast, the Eureka Stockade 
banner, which is sometimes touted as a rival to and even replacement for the 
national flag, lacks any official status.64 
In 1998, the Howard government sought to entrench the status of the 
national flag. Although – unlike Australia’s anthem65 – its national flag was 
not adopted by a plebiscite or referendum, the Flags Act now says it can 
only be changed by referendum.66 Perhaps befitting the regulation of flags, 
this amendment was essentially symbolic and political. Since only the 
                                                           
59  Flags Act 1953 (Cth), s 3, Sch 1. 
60  For a full history of the Australian flag, see Kwan (2006). Sub-national flags proliferate: 
variants include light blue (Air Force), white (Navy) and light blue with dark blue cross 
(Civil Aviation). The Defence Force has its own completely distinct flag. Even the 
Customs Service has its own flag: a dull variant of the standard Australian flag with 
‘Customs’ emblazoned across it in white ink. 
61  The Indigenous flag is copyright to its designer; the Torres Strait flag is copyright to the 
Island Coordinating Council: Australian Government (nd).  
62  Devetak (2003), Ch 2. 
63  Despite Prime Minister Howard having previously objected to their official recognition as 
divisive: White (2008), p 5. 
64  Indeed, Prime Minister Howard forbade it from being flown at Parliament House. 
65  By plebiscite in 1977; ‘Advance Australia Fair’ was proclaimed as the anthem in 1984: 
Orr (2000), p 119. 
66  Flags Act 1953 (Cth), s 3(2). 
ORR: A FETISHISED GIFT 517 
Constitution is higher law, a later Parliament may simply undo the 
entrenchment to alter the flag.67 The real meaning of the ‘entrenchment’ lay 
outside any legal effect it purported to have. It was an act of political theatre, 
a dare to ‘stand up and be counted’ for the current flag’s design. That it 
occurred at all presupposed a degree of fetishism of the flag in the wider 
electorate.  
Attempts at limiting uses of the flag in Australia have invariably 
foundered. A year after the Cronulla race riots of late 2005, the organisers of 
the Big Day Out rock concert banned patrons from bringing flags (of any 
nationality) into the event. Besides the concern that one person’s flag-
waving obscures the view of others, the organisers argued that the flag was 
politicising a musical event.68 The decision might have passed with little 
fanfare, as a passing act of proprietorial censorship. However, the flag’s 
public status transcends such public/private analysis. Then Prime Minister 
Howard and opposition leader Kevin Rudd joined in fulminating that the ban 
was a gross form of ‘political correctness’.69 New South Wales’ then 
opposition leader even proposed legislation to neuter any private ban of 
public displays of the Australian flag.70  
An ambivalent reception also greeted a 2004 announcement by federal 
Education Minister Brendan Nelson that tied school funding to a 
requirement that each school maintain a ‘working’ flagpole for the 
Australian flag. Conditional grants are commonplace in federal regulation, 
but usually there is a clear link between the policy area and the condition of 
funding (for instance, between receipt of funding and educational quality). 
The minister’s critics read the gesture as another salvo in the ‘culture’ wars.71 
Certainly, viewed pragmatically, the policy appeared otiose and heavy-
handed: otiose since most schools already flew the flag,72 and heavy-handed 
since schools that lacked the money to build and maintain a flagpole had, by 
definition, more pressing needs.73 But there was a logic to the government’s 
action. Borrowing from US practice, mandating flag-flying at schools 
extends the flag’s formal status into the physical environment of compulsory 
education, furthering its potential fetishisation. 
                                                           
67  A government would not do so unless it had broad support – lest it appear afraid of a vote 
on this issue. But no government would be likely to propose a change of flag unless there 
were broad support to begin with. So the amendment had neither legal efficacy nor even 
any political necessity. 
68  ABC Radio, PM (2007).  
69  ABC Radio, PM (2007). 
70  Echoing the Freedom to Display the American Flag Act 2005 (US), which prevents bodies 
like residential body corporates from restricting their members displaying the flag. In 
contrast, his state counterpart, Premier Iemma, accused him of politicising a social issue 
that required no further legislation. See Pearlman and Dunn (2007). 
71  Clark (2006). 
72  ‘The Australian Flag should be flown at State Government schools along with the 
Queensland Flag where possible.’ Queensland Government (2009), p 26. 
73  Clark (2006). 
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Flag Destruction in Australia 
Flag-burning has occurred in Australia as part of social and political protest. 
Examples include burnings by an Indigenous activist on ‘Invasion Day’ 
(Australia Day),74 and by a Lebanese-Australian during the Cronulla race 
riots.75 In Australia, however, there is no specific law against flag 
destruction,76 merely general offences such as disorderly or dangerous 
conduct and destruction of private or government property.77 The flag is not 
a necessary element of such offences. There have been attempts to legislate 
an offence of destroying an Australian flag. In 2003, 2006 and 2008, Private 
Members’ Bills were presented to ‘prevent the desecration or wilful 
destruction’ of Australian flags.78 The 2008 Bill would have criminalised 
acts ‘wilfully damaging, destroying, burning, defacing, mutilating or 
trampling upon or otherwise desecrating an official flag’.79 Penalties 
proposed have been low key: a maximum fine of two penalty units 
(approximately $220) or a community service order. Such Bills have fallen 
on deaf ears. Prime Minister Howard declined to support an offence of flag-
destruction, giving reasons similar to his refusal to directly attack ultra-
nationalist Pauline Hanson, namely that it could draw attention to or even 
martyr the cause.  
There is a nice argument about whether such a law would infringe the 
implied freedom of political communication.80 The answer lies somewhere 
between Levy v Victoria81 and Coleman v Power.82 The former case permitted 
laws restricting protest on safety grounds; the latter case overturned an 
offence of ‘insulting words’ in public. In strictly legal terms, of course, a 
flag cannot possess civil rights, though it is feasible that the High Court 
might eschew liberal reasoning and take a non-instrumental view of the flag 
as something unique, with a dignity susceptible of legal protection. It is even 
possible, as Dan Meagher reasons, that the court could adopt a ‘pro-civility’, 
as opposed to a ‘robust’, conception of communicative freedom.83 Either 
approach would permit a prohibition on the wilful destruction of flags in 
settings intended to cause offence.  
However, the Australian High Court is more likely to follow the US 
approach. Mr Coleman, as it happened, tested the lower courts with an act of 
                                                           
74  ABC News Online (2008).  
75  Daily Telegraph (Sydney) (2006). 
76  Stobbs (2006), pp 20–21. For detailed discussion of such legislative attempts, see 
Meagher (2009). 
77  Stobbs (2006). 
78  For example, Flags (Protection of Australian Flags) Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth), 
sponsored by a Liberal Senator. 
79  A list that almost seems designed to give protestors ideas. 
80  Meagher (2009), pp 87–95. 
81  Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
82  Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1. 
83  Meagher (2009), pp 89–95. 
ORR: A FETISHISED GIFT 519 
flag-burning in 2001. He was arrested after igniting a large flag at an 
outdoors Australia Day gathering and citizenship ceremony, to protest the 
treatment of asylum seekers. Although his efforts were somewhat risible 
(onlookers laughed, rather than taking offence, at his initially unsuccessful 
attempts to light the flag), the magistrate convicted him on a charge of 
disorderly behaviour. In Coleman v Kinbacher, the Queensland Court of 
Appeal upheld the conviction, but only on the grounds that the size of the 
flag and proximity of a large crowd made the action not so much politically 
provocative as physically dangerous and alarming.84 Had Coleman taken 
more physical care, he was free to burn flags in public. 
The Queensland Court for its part followed a Northern Territory 
decision of Watson v Trenery.85 In that case, pro-Timorese demonstrators 
who torched 20 Indonesian flags were acquitted of disorderly behaviour, as 
the setting and size of the flags and flames posed only the most minor danger 
or disruption to others. This approach of measuring disorderly conduct on a 
purely objective scale is even kinder to flag-burners than Morse in New 
Zealand, where an intent to offend was invoked. But again, the lesson for 
present purposes is not about constitutional speech doctrine, but that the law 
is reluctant to limit the use of the flag, since its underlying purpose is to give 
birth to the flag but then present it to ‘the people’. 
Making Sense of Flag Destruction 
Unless we anthropomorphise the flag, the real interests being advanced by 
any law seeking to protect (rather than merely establish) a flag are not the 
interests of ‘the flag’, but: 
(a) the sensibilities of those who hold the flag in special reverence, and 
(b) the state interest in the flag as a symbol to engender a collective 
esprit de corps. 
Even if one accepts those interests as justifying flag protection laws, a 
problem arises as to the reach of such laws. Are only physical flags 
protected, or do the laws control any representation of the flag? The flag is 
essentially an image, albeit in a traditionally tangible, cloth form. If it were a 
wrong to deface a ‘real’ flag, even to make a political point, is it not the 
same kind of wrong to depict, say, someone urinating on a flag, to make the 
same point?86 
As Eric Posner suggests, laws against flag-destruction may only serve 
to reify the flag’s symbolism.87 If so, they invite the very thing they purport 
to prohibit, and not merely because enforcing these laws risks martyring and 
drawing attention to the protestors concerned. Such laws risk elevating the 
                                                           
84  Coleman v Kinbacher [2003] QCA 575. 
85  Watson v Trenery (1998) 122 NTR 1. 
86  The German Constitutional Court faced that very issue, and held in that case that freedom 
of artistic expression meant the prohibition on desecrating the flag should not apply: Quint 
(1992). 
87  Posner (1998), p 798. 
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flag beyond fetish to taboo: they render its defacement a peculiarly 
satisfying transgression above and beyond any shock value to any witnesses. 
In Western societies, legal norms isolating the flag for special 
protection may also present an unusual structure: can something which its 
supporters routinely claim symbolises liberal freedoms be protected by a law 
that limits expressive displays and the liberty to control, even destroy, one’s 
own property? It is difficult to find a real analogy for laws criminalising 
flag-destruction. Prohibitions against destroying currency are inapt. While 
currency can be fetishised and it is intimately linked to national identity and 
power, prohibitions on destroying currency have the instrumental aim of 
ensuring a state monopoly on its supply, dating to a time when legal tender 
(rather than credit) was the chief repository of value.88 Flag-destruction 
offences hardly aim to protect or control the supply of flags. On the contrary, 
the law wants the flag to proliferate. Prohibitions on destroying artefacts are 
similarly distinguishable. While its design is unique, no individual flag is – 
indeed, the flag draws strength and solidarity from its easy reproducibility. 
Destroying or defacing the flag can itself become a meta-ritual, not 
merely an individual act of expression but a rolling affront to social norms. 
Any act as mannered or planned as bringing a flag to a demonstration, with 
inflammatory liquid, is a self-reflexive rather than spontaneous act of 
dissent. Part of the intent is to attract and outrage public attention, preferably 
via the media. Performed with such deliberation, flag-burning is a poor 
man’s PR stunt. If overdone, such protest can become a cliché, a childish 
attempt to provoke reaction, whose shock value – like that of swearing – 
may only dilute over time. In New Zealand, Morse’s lead in burning her 
country’s flag at an Anzac Day Service was taken a banal step further in 
2009, when a student burnt a flag outside a Victoria University of 
Wellington Student Association meeting. The purpose of the meeting was 
not to commemorate Anzac Day, but merely ‘to debate [the Student 
Association’s] rejection of a Wellington City Council invitation’ to lay an 
ANZAC wreath the previous month.89  
Eric Posner enunciates a similar theme, albeit clad in the language of 
law and economics (of ‘separating equilibrium’ and ‘passive pooling 
equilibrium’).90 The power of a symbol, he points out, cannot be legislated. If 
everyone saluted the flag, the act would have little meaning other than that 
failure to conform would demark someone as a blatant dissenter. 
Conversely, if few people respect a flag, its social meaning dissipates to the 
point where defying or destroying it becomes meaningless. As Justice 
Stevens – the liberal who would have upheld flag-destruction laws in the 
United States – confessed to a journalist recently: 
                                                           
88  Prohibitions against destruction of legal tender may also have originated in an attempt to 
reassure the currency fetishist unnerved by the shift from ‘real’ coin made of 
indestructible metal like gold and silver. 
89  Otago Daily Times Online (2009), emphasis added. 
90  Posner (1998), pp 789–95. 
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The funny thing about [Texas v Johnson] is, the only consequence of 
it – nobody burns flags anymore … It was an important symbolic 
form of protest at the time. But nobody does it anymore. As long as 
it’s legal, it’s not a big deal.91 
Conclusion: Value Without Values 
Flags, historically, were about ‘sides’. Their use in battles literally demarked 
which side one was on. While the modern nation is not essentially a martial 
construct, elements of this signalling of ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ remain, 
most obviously in the deployment of national flags at sporting events. 
Keating and Orwell captured this tendency to exclusiveness in their 
distinction between nationalism and patriotism. In this dichotomy, there is a 
world of difference between the injunction to ‘Support it. Or F#ck off’ and 
the invitation to quietly raise and lower the flag each day at a kindergarten. 
And the difference is not simply in the militancy of the former and the quiet 
tenor of the latter, although clearly one is a respectful gesture, potentially 
expressing an inclusive idea of the nation-as-a community, in a way the 
other is not. 
Rather, to borrow from Billig, the quiet raising of a flag at a 
kindergarten is an act of ‘banal’ rather than bellicose nationalism. Its relative 
subtlety paradoxically renders it a stronger gesture, especially in a polity that 
seeks to project stability and restraint. Yet both the bumper sticker and the 
kindergarten flag-pole are instances of ‘flag-waving’ in the sense of being 
overt and public displays of the flag. Both perform an attachment to the flag. 
Is there any meaning to which both attach? 
My argument has been that the flag is an important, albeit empty, gift. 
Especially in a pluralistic nation, the flag embodies no values. This essay 
opened with a reflection on flags at kindergartens. As a Canadian study has 
shown, children as young as six recognise that flags are, at root, entirely 
conventional.92 It takes some time for children to come to see flags as 
bearing any symbolic meaning.93 If they attribute any meaning to them, 
younger children see flags in functional terms, as a marker of place. They 
reason that it is worse to burn a country’s map than its flag, because a map 
has a clearly practical use.94  
In this childish view of the flag lies a superficial insight. The closest 
any flag comes to having an objective meaning is as a geographical and 
geopolitical signpost. Obviously, no Australian flies the flag as a courtesy to 
Martians or bewildered foreigners who find themselves lost on this territory. 
Yet a flag outside a consulate does signal ‘you are on this nation’s territory’ 
and a flag in a sporting crowd signals ‘that’s the team I’m supporting’. That 
                                                           
91  Toobin (2010), p 43. Similarly, see Stevens’ prognostication in US v Eichman 496 US 310 
(1990) at 323. 
92  Helwig and Prencipe (1999), p 140. 
93  Weinstein (1957). 
94  Helwig and Prencipe (1999), p 140. 
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signage role can be linked to a larger boundary-drawing purpose implicit in 
the official designation of a national flag as a unifying emblem. To say that 
the Australian flag stands for ‘Australianness’ is to risk tautology, but it is a 
necessarily empty formulation. Once the flag moves outside its narrow 
signalling role and becomes embraced in general community usage, each 
Australian has still to imagine what (if anything) binds them to their 
neighbours, and them to everyone else who inhabits this continent.  
Seeing the flag as an emblem of ‘Australianness’ does not mean the 
flag is inherently a denial of whatever lies outside the nation. Certainly, as 
the otherwise disparate experiences of flag-consumption after September 11, 
flag-waving on ANZAC Day and xenophobic ‘Support it. Or F*#k off’ 
stickers reveal, a sense of conflict can be a potent enhancement to 
attachments to the flag. However, that conflict need not be exogenous to the 
nation; the conflict more commonly and naturally arises from within the 
state, as flags serve as ‘amplifying mirrors of social, political and cultural 
changes and competitions’.95 The flag, a priori, captures no particular set of 
such values. 
Though it may seem unlikely, a ‘kindy dad’ could run the flag up the 
flagpole and, in his heart, believe it stands for White Australia. We might 
watch children smiling while they gaze at a flag without knowing if they are 
revering it and enjoying a sense of incipient national identity, are just 
enjoying the sight of blue flag billowing against blue sky, or are merely 
stifling a yawn with an inane smile. Similarly, someone may drive a car with 
a ‘Keep this our Flag Forever’ sticker on it, and believe she is counselling 
respect for a radical history, the way adherents of the Eureka flag do.96 Only 
when we begin to introduce more context, such as evidence of motivation 
and audience, can we begin to ‘read’ any particular use of the flag. Thus a 
teenager, wrapping their bare skin in a flag on the way to an ethnically 
charged confrontation at the beach, is sending fairly unambiguous signals; 
yet if another teenager climbed her school flagpole and took the flag for a 
lap of her school’s athletic carnival, the meaning might be entirely ironic. 
Even the flag burner expresses no necessary message. He or she may be 
burning the flag as a spectacle, an incendiary device to attract attention to an 
underlying message (just as street marches and strikes are not inherently 
radical activities, but time-honoured forms of attracting attention to a cause). 
Alternatively, a flag may be burnt as shorthand for something specific, such 
as the policies of the current administration, or a particular foreign policy. Or 
a flag might simply be burnt to be nihilistic or gratuitously insulting. 
None of this is to say that a flag is devoid of meaning; rather, it can 
embrace a plethora of meanings. Conservatives tend to accentuate national 
pride, and presume the flag represents values such as loyalty to ethnic roots 
(accenting the Union Jack) or, more recently, unity (accenting the federation 
star). But progressives are increasingly being encouraged to fly the flag – for 
                                                           
95  Foret (2009), p 313. 
96  Compare the discussion of attempts to ‘reconstruct’ the Union Jack to give it progressive 
connotations in Reichl (2004). 
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instance, at trade union rallies. Labor Party iconography has long drawn on 
the Australian flag. Its most distinctive feature, the southern cross, can be 
seen as an emblem of benevolent nature, shining equally on all of us. As 
Elizabeth Kwan demonstrates, the Australian flag was a particularly 
contested device in the aftermath of World War I: Catholics of Irish descent 
happily saw in it a relegation of the Union Jack.97 Today, the reverse holds 
true, with some republicans calling for a new design, against monarchists 
who honour the Union Jack’s remnant place on the flag’s hoist. As we noted 
at the outset, it might hardly matter if the present flag were replaced, say, 
with the boxing kangaroo emblem.98 Once the shock of the new faded, 
conservatives could see it as an expression of pugnacious individualism and 
radicals could see it as a sign of the underdog spirit. 
What is ultimately significant is, first, that the flag matters to so many 
people, whether they are flag observant or sceptical, nationalists or 
internationalists. The flag’s continuing relevance depends on its being the 
subject of a commonplace, not an obscure, fetish and the site for popular, 
rather than elite or academic, debates and protests about values and identity. 
Second, it matters that there is only one flag designated for a particular 
purpose. In theory, we could have multiple Australian flags, each one 
cleverly echoing some particular national myth or characteristic, each one 
prêt a porter for suitable events or occasions. But then, who would bother? 
There would be a diffusion of interest because there would be nothing 
singular to rally around, or against. The national flag would no longer 
occupy its place in the law as a singular gift of the state to the people it 
purports to serve.  
That gift is often interpreted as a conservative thing, for undoubtedly 
the state has an interest in its own longevity and stability, and hence the flag 
is designated with an intention to bind. But it is not a Trojan gift, since a flag 
no more imposes a smothering uniformity than it offers a shared space, an 
object on to which we can project our contested values. The law’s 
designation of an official flag is a gift to the people, an invitation to society 
to interpret and employ the flag in a multiplicity of ways, whether civilly or 
provocatively, whether quietly or brazenly, whether as an easy commercial 
backdrop or as an ironic gesture. A flag’s proliferation entrenches its status, 
but its status is rooted in the unique position given to it by law, out of which 
the fixation around it is born. There is little that irreducibly unites different 
acts of flag-waving, or for that matter different occasions of flag-destruction, 
aside from that fetishism. But flag promoters and flag detractors rally, if 
unwittingly, around one theme: a flag has value, even if we cannot agree on 
its values. The antithesis of flag-waving would not so much be flag-burning 
as it would be flag apathy.  
                                                           
97  Kwan (1994). 
98  It would hardly matter to Australians squabbling over its meaning; to outsiders used to 
staid designs, such a cartoon image would seem either revolutionary or risible. 
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people attribute a power to the flag - a power they recognise over themselves and others
with whom they share a body politic. A key source of this fetishisation is its official, legal
designation. Though it embodies no particular values, a flag is valued, even fetishised, by
flag-wavers and flag-burners alike.
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